Rule against legislative reversal of judicial judgments

The rule against legislative reversal of judicial judgments distinguishes changing the law for future cases from undoing a court’s determination in a particular case. In the Federalist argument, the distinction protects the boundaries between legislative and judicial authority: lawmakers may prescribe a new rule, but cannot use legislation to reverse a judgment already rendered.

The boundary between legislation and judgment

Hamilton rejects the claim that the proposed Constitution uniquely exposes judicial decisions to legislative revision. Neither the theory of the British constitution nor that of the state constitutions, he argues, authorizes a legislative act to revise a judicial sentence. The proposed national Constitution contains no special permission to do so, but neither does it create a special prohibition; the obstacle is the general principle of law and reason.

That principle is categorical in its application to a decided case. A legislature acting within its proper sphere cannot reverse a determination already made in a particular case. It may, however, prescribe a new rule to govern future cases. The distinction preserves legislative power to make law while denying it the power to substitute its judgment for that of a court after adjudication.

A common rule for state and national governments

Hamilton stresses that the proposed rule is not a novel privilege of the federal government. The same principle applies, in the same manner and to the same extent, to the state governments and the national government under consideration. He says no difference can be identified between them on this point.

This comparison answers the charge that the proposed Constitution gives federal institutions a dangerous power unavailable under existing state arrangements. The relevant limitation does not depend on a special constitutional clause granting or withholding authority to revise judgments. It follows instead from the proper limits of legislative action in any government operating under law.

Delegated authority and constitutional limits

The argument also connects the rule to the broader structure of constitutional authority. A legislature exercises delegated power; an act contrary to the terms of the commission under which that power is exercised is void. In a limited Constitution, courts must be able to declare acts contrary to its manifest terms void, or its specified restrictions would have no practical force.

That account does not make the judiciary superior to the legislature. Rather, both are bounded by the authority from which their powers derive. A legislative act cannot validly reverse a judicial determination merely because the legislature has lawmaking authority: that authority permits new rules for future cases, not retrospective substitution of legislative judgment for a court’s decision. The rule thus marks a boundary within government while keeping state and national institutions subject to the same principle.